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Project Summary  
In this study we evaluate a Gas Station resupply method for Distributed Lethality (DL) 
scenarios, and obtain some insights about the interplay among spatial, temporal and 
capacity parameters related to this mode of resupply. Our motivating questions are: 
What is the effect of the ratio between supply ship capacity and combat ship on-board 
capacity on logistic responsiveness? How does the location of the Gas Station affect that 
responsiveness? What is the impact of the number of Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs) 
served by the Gas Station? Shall the Gas Station be a shuttle (i.e., a ship that goes back 
and forth to port to replenish) or a delivery ship that is being resupplied by a separate 
shuttle? Our results do not necessarily establish a specific blueprint for logistic planning, 
but rather point out at key factors and considerations 
Background 
Changes in the global political and strategic environments have resulted in some 
modifications in US defense strategies. In particular, these changes have led to the 
emergence of a new naval operational concept: Distributed Lethality (DL) [1]. From the 
force-employment point of view, the DL concept calls for fragmenting the traditional 
naval battle/strike groups into smaller, more agile and lethal Surface Action Groups 
(SAGs) or Adaptive Force Packages (AFP) comprising a small number of surface vessels. 
The SAGs and AFPs operate in a distributed manner over a relatively large area of 
operations. Tactical implications of the DL concept have been studied by the 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Surface and Mine War-fighting Development Center 
Command, and Naval War College (NWC). The studies are based on a Distributed 
Lethality Task Force and war games conducted at the NWC. The DL concept brings about 
a serious logistic challenge: how to effectively and efficiently satisfy logistic demands at 
different times and many locations dispersed over a large area. A fundamental dilemma 
in this context is choosing between two logistic principles: flexibility, derived from 
concentrating resources, and attainability obtained from distributing them [2]. 
Concentrating resources at the operational level, either on land or afloat, enhances 
logistic flexibility by directing resources only to areas of need. This principle has two 
important benefits. First, similarly to the inventory-pooling principle in commercial 
supply chain management [3], operational flexibility saves resources and enhances 
efficiency. Second, holding resources in a central location at the back of the AOI 
minimizes the logistic tail of the forward deployed AFPs, and thus reduces the AFPs' 
signature as targets, and make them more tactically agile. Third, keeping the inventories 
afloat in the relatively safe communication zone, beyond the threat area, enhances the 
survivability of the supplies. However, these positive features of concentrating logistics 
at the communication zone come at the cost of timeliness; the lead time required for 
shipping supplies from a central theater source at the back of the theater to the DL 
tactical units may be long.  
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SAGs or AFPs are small and agile; they may find it difficult to “drag" a logistic tail and 
protect it. Thus, the DL concept implies the transition from the traditional shuttle ship/ 
delivery ship setup, typical to CVN battle groups, where a delivery ship is attached to the 
battle group and a shuttle ship resupplies it with resources pulled from the theater 
logistic base, to a new approach that we denote the Gas Station setup. In the 
Gas Station approach, the AFPs need to travel back from the combat zone to meet a 
resupply source, e.g., an AOE or T-AO ship, in the communication zone. The objective of 
this study is to evaluate the Gas Station resupply method for DL scenarios and obtain 
some insights regarding the interplay among spatial, temporal and capacity parameters 
related to this mode of resupply.  
Findings and Conclusions  
Distributed lethality is an operational concept that embodies significant logistic 
implications.  The existing logistic system supporting carrier battle group, where the 
logistic tail is an integral part of the tactical force – the shuttle-delivery ship setup – will 
clearly be inappropriate when the force structure is fragmented into small AFPs. 
Attaching a logistic tail to each such AFP is neither economically viable nor operationally 
feasible. A new logistic structure is required that adequately responds to the new naval 
force layout. 
In this report we model and analyze the Gas Station setup where an AOE is deployed at 
a certain resupply point in the communication zone and AFPs travel from their stations 
to that point to be resupplied. We define the utilization rate - the fraction of time the 
AFP is on station - as a measure of effectiveness. From a relatively simple model, with 
only one AFP, we see that for resupply points relatively far away from the AFP stations, 
the utilization rate is insensitive to the capacity of the AOE; the dominant factor is the 
travel time of the AFP to the resupply point. If the AOE is deployed closer to the combat 
area we see some differences in utilization rates for different capacities; for high 
capacities the utility is monotone increasing as the AOE gets closer to the combat zone 
but for low capacities there is an optimal resupply point closer to port. In the more 
realistic, and relevant, case when there are multiple AFPs we see that the utilization 
rate, as well as the probability an AFP has to wait for the AOE, are sensitive to the size of 
the operating force in the theater, but only when the force is relatively large. For any 
distance of the resupply point a, the utilization rate is very similar when the force size is 
between 1 and 4 AFPs. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The work in this project can be extended in several directions. The linear situation 
described in this report (optimizing the value of the resupply point on a line) can be 
extended to a two-dimensional situation, taking into account spatial considerations, as 
well as variable demand scenarios. Also, the underlying queuing problem may be 
addressed with more rigorous mathematical tools. Finally, while our research did 
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address attritional aspects embedding the logistic model in a combat one may produce 
additional insights. 
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